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Introduction: The present study sought to examine two methods by which to improve
decision making on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT): inducing a negative mood and providing
additional learning trials.
Method: In the first study, 194 undergraduate students [74 male; Mage = 19.44 (SD =
3.69)] were randomly assigned to view a series of pictures to induce a positive, negative,
or neutral mood immediately prior to the IGT. In the second study, 276 undergraduate
students [111 male; Mage = 19.18 (SD = 2.58)] completed a delay discounting task and
back-to-back administrations of the IGT.
Results: Participants in an induced negative mood selected more from Deck C during
the final trials than those in an induced positive mood. Providing additional learning trials
resulted in better decision making: participants shifted their focus from the frequency of
immediate gains/losses (i.e., a preference for Decks B and D) to long-term outcomes (i.e.,
a preference for Deck D). In addition, disadvantageous decision making on the additional
learning trials was associated with larger delay discounting (i.e., a preference for more
immediate but smaller rewards).
Conclusions: The present results indicate that decision making is affected by negative
mood state, and that decision making can be improved by increasing the number of
learning trials. In addition, the current results provide evidence of a relationship between
performance on the IGT and on a separate measure of decision making, the delay
discounting task. Moreover, the present results indicate that improved decision making
on the IGT can be attributed to shifting focus toward long-term outcomes, as evidenced
by increased selections from advantageous decks as well as correlations between the IGT
and delay discounting task. Implications for the assessment of decision making using the
IGT are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Individuals are called upon to make decisions on a daily basis.
Some of these decisions can bemade through a calculated analysis
of available options—weighing individual risks and benefits. This
process has been termed “cold” decision making (Shafir et al.,
1993; Seguin et al., 2007). Conversely, some decisions require
individuals to rely instead on gut feelings and instincts. Decision
making that involves this affective component is termed “hot”
decision making (Damasio, 1994; Seguin et al., 2007). As many
decisions can have long-term effects on an individual (Bechara
et al., 1994; Denburg et al., 2006), it is important to understand
not just how individuals make decisions, but whether the decision
making process can be improved.
One of the most popular behavioral measures of affective deci-
sion making processes is the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara
et al., 1994). The IGT was created to assess decision making
impairments among individuals with documented damage to the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) who were experiencing
real-world decision making deficits but performed within nor-
mal limits on formal assessment of executive functions. During
the task, participants are given 100 trials in which to maximize
profit. Selections are made from one of four decks of cards (A, B,
C, D). On each selection, participants win money but also some-
times lose money (see Figure 1; Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara,
2008). Decks A and B provide an average immediate gain of $100,
whereas Decks C and D provide $50. But, after 10 selections from
Decks A or B, participants have incurred a net loss of $250. Ten
selections from Decks C or D instead result in a net gain of $250.
Based on these long-term outcomes, Decks A and B have been
termed “disadvantageous” and Decks C and D “advantageous”
(Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, 2008). Performance on the IGT
is typically broken down into 20-card blocks of trials; however,
at the start of the task, participants are not told much about the
relative risks and benefits of each deck. Thus, the first 40 trials
have been termed decision making under ambiguity (Brand et al.,
2007). The final 60 trials, in which the relative risks and benefits of
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FIGURE 1 | Deck contingencies on the Iowa gambling task.
each deck are better known, are instead termed decision making
under risk. Disadvantageous decision making on this task is typ-
ically defined as continued selections from the disadvantageous
decks during these later trials, and has been shown across multiple
clinical samples (see Buelow and Suhr, 2009).
However, examining performance in this manner can mask
differences in preferences for individual decks. For example, mul-
tiple studies have shown a Deck B preference (e.g., Toplak et al.,
2005; Caroselli et al., 2006; Fernie and Tunney, 2006). Decks A
and B differ in frequency and magnitude of immediate losses
(Bechara, 2008). Deck A results in losses on 50% of trials, and
the individual losses are smaller in magnitude. Deck B experi-
ences much larger losses but on only 10% of trials. The same
holds for Decks C (50% smaller losses) and D (10% larger losses).
Thus, it is possible that differences in preferences between Decks
A and B (and Decks C and D) can be attributed to individ-
ual differences in preference for a high frequency of positive
short-term outcomes over long-term gains (Chiu et al., 2008). In
real-world decisions, these facets are often juxtaposed. For exam-
ple, cigarette smokers must weigh the immediate gains (removal
of withdrawal symptoms) and long-term outcomes (health risks)
in deciding to smoke each day. Alternatively, for individuals form-
ing new romantic relationships in which the immediate gains and
long-term outcomes are equally beneficial (i.e., both individuals
elicit positive feelings in one another and have similar long-term
goals), the focus on short- vs. long-term goals should not matter.
However, if there is a discrepancy in these goals, then individuals
would need to decide whether the short-term gains outweigh any
long-term negative consequences.
The creators of the IGT put forth the somatic marker hypoth-
esis to explain task performance. According to this hypothesis,
the experience of emotion is critical to the decision-making pro-
cess (Bechara, 2004). Gut feelings, or somatic markers, help guide
decision making, even before individuals are consciously aware of
this process. Multiple studies have shown the presence of antic-
ipatory somatic responses before disadvantageous decisions (see
Dunn et al., 2006, for a review). Processing of somatic markers by
the VMPFC, amygdala, and other structures (Bechara et al., 1994,
1999; Davidson, 2002) could explain how individuals quickly
learn to choose advantageously on the IGT. Thus, it is plausible
that directly manipulating one’s mood state may impact decision
making processes. If emotions help guide decision making, delib-
erately putting someone in a positive or negative mood could alter
their decision making.
Previous research has shown that subjective mood states can
influence decision making processes (Schwarz and Clore, 1983;
Forgas, 1995). Disadvantageous decision making on the IGT and
other tasks is seen with self-reported negative mood state (Tice
et al., 2001; Kaplan et al., 2006; Suhr and Tsanadis, 2007; Roiser
et al., 2009a) however, others have shown more advantageous
decision making with both negative (Smoski et al., 2008; Heilman
et al., 2010) and positive (Nygren et al., 1996; Roiser et al., 2009b)
mood state. Mood state can also affect the frequency of risk-
taking behaviors (Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Arkes et al., 1988;
Finucane et al., 2000). Being in a positive mood could help deci-
sion making by increasing creativity and problem solving (Isen,
1987; Murray et al., 1990; Gasper, 2004; Hirt et al., 2008), allow-
ing for focus on available and general knowledge to arrive at a
conclusion (Melton, 1995; Bless et al., 1996; Gasper and Clore,
2002; Ruder and Bless, 2003; Bramesfeld and Gasper, 2008).
Positive mood could indicate a situation is benign, leading to
approach-based behaviors (Gasper, 2003; Grawitch and Munz,
2005).
As the IGT was designed as a hot, affective decision mak-
ing task, it is likely that mood state influences performance.
Individuals in a negative moodmay think through their selections
more, leading them to prefer decks that maximize long-term out-
comes. In fact, individuals who perform well on the IGT, in that
they choose from decks with a long-term reward, engage in more
effortful cognitive processes (assessed via a questionnaire regard-
ing deck probabilities at task completion) compared to those with
more disadvantageous performance (e.g., Busemeyer and Stout,
2002; Guillaume et al., 2009). Thus, negative mood may increase
level of elaboration on each decision, in turn increasing cogni-
tive deliberation on the task. This process may lead individuals
to consider long-term instead of short-term outcomes, ultimately
improving decisions.
Research that has directly manipulated mood has indicated
both negative (Lerner et al., 2003; Yuen and Lee, 2003; Chou
et al., 2007; Harlé and Sanfey, 2007; Cryder et al., 2008) and pos-
itive (de Vries et al., 2008) mood can lead to more advantageous
decision making. When the IGT and a second behavioral deci-
sion making task, the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez
et al., 2002) were examined, Heilman and colleagues (2010) found
emotional regulation, not manipulation of negative mood, was
the factor that affected decision making. Others have examined
mood and financial decision making, showing negative mood
increased impatience and lead to an inability to delay gratification
for larger future rewards (Lerner et al., 2013). Of the literature
that has manipulatedmood state, few have used the IGT in partic-
ular (see de Vries et al., 2008; Heilman et al., 2010, for exceptions).
Manipulating, rather than measuring, mood allows for a more
stringent examination of the impact of mood on decisionmaking.
Recent research has also begun to investigate a second means
of potentially improving decision making—adding learning tri-
als. Providing additional trials on the IGT reversed a decision
making impairment among individuals with Parkinson’s disease
(Buelow et al., 2013) and in a small non-clinical sample (Lin et al.,
2013). Studies of decision making using the IGT have shown that
some individuals fail to develop a deck preference (e.g., Peters
and Slovic, 2000; Mueller et al., 2010), so providing additional
trials may result in more advantageous decision making for this
subset of individuals. In Study 2, we sought to examine a largely
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unexamined means of improving decision making: providing
additional learning trials. In addition, performance on the delay
discounting task (Kirby et al., 1999) was assessed to determine if
temporal focus could be seen across tasks.
Individuals are asked to make decisions in everyday life in
which choices must be made between immediate and delayed
rewards. In some cases, the immediate reward is of a smaller
magnitude than the delayed reward, but the higher value of the
delayed reward is offset by the length of time until its receipt
(Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995). Although most individuals pre-
fer an immediate reward, if given a choice (Green and Myerson,
2004), those who do choose the immediate reward can be viewed
as impulsive (Rachlin and Green, 1972; Teuscher and Mitchell,
2011), whereas those who “hold out” for the delayed reward are
seen as able to delay gratification or inhibit impulses (Rachlin and
Green, 1972; Appelhans et al., 2011). Delay discounting occurs
when individuals discount (or decrease) the value of a delayed
reward in favor of a smaller but more immediate reward (Rachlin
and Green, 1972; Ainslie, 1974; Bickel et al., 1999; Green and
Myerson, 2004).
Delay discounting (a preference for smaller, immediate
rewards over larger but distant rewards) is seen across multi-
ple addictive and risky behaviors (for reviews, see de Wit, 2008;
MacKillop et al., 2011). In addition, performance on delay dis-
counting tasks has been associated with real-world outcomes such
as involvement in financial and other risk-taking behaviors (Kirby
et al., 2005; Bickel et al., 2010; Sun and Li, 2010). It is believed that
discounting of future rewards aids in real-world decision making
by helping individuals differentiate between options (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979).
Researchers have also investigated the neurobiological under-
pinnings of delay discounting and the evaluation of temporal
delays in decision making. Evidence suggests that the same struc-
tures implicated in IGT performance (i.e., orbitofrontal cor-
tex and amygdala) are activated during delay discounting tasks
(Bechara et al., 1994, 1999; McClure et al., 2004; O’Doherty,
2004; Shamosh et al., 2008; Ballard and Knutson, 2009). However,
few have directly investigated correlations between the IGT and
delay discounting tasks. Xu et al. (2013) found no correlation
between the IGT and delay discounting. In a separate study,
Perales et al. (2009) administered both the IGT and a delay dis-
counting task, but failed to report a correlation between the
two tasks. However, Sellitto et al. (2010) found that damage
to the orbitofrontal cortex (i.e., a structure implicated in deci-
sion making on the IGT; Bechara, 2008), increased preference
for smaller, more immediate rewards over larger but distant
rewards. Thus, it is possible that performance on the tasks is
linked.
Mood has also been shown to affect delay discounting.
Inducing a positive mood moderates the relationship between
impulsiveness and delay discounting, in that impulsive individ-
uals in a positive mood discount future values to a greater degree
than those in a negative mood (Koff and Lucas, 2011). Positive
mood also affects the relationship between extraversion and delay
discounting, in that extraverted individuals in a positive mood
prefer more immediate rewards than extraverted individuals not
in a positive mood (Hirsh et al., 2010). Inducing a negative mood,
on the other hand, decreases delay discounting in a control sam-
ple (Lawrence et al., 2010). Thus, it is clear that mood state
impacts the degree to which individuals discount future outcomes
in favor of smaller but more immediate rewards.
PRESENT STUDIES
The present studies sought to examine two potential methods by
which decision making could be improved: inducing a negative
mood and providing additional learning trials. Research using
both self-reportedmood andmood inductions indicates that neg-
ative mood can improve decision making on the IGT and other
tasks (e.g., Nygren et al., 1996; Smoski et al., 2008; Roiser et al.,
2009b; Heilman et al., 2010), whereas research into providing
additional trials on the IGT is newer (Buelow et al., 2013; Lin
et al., 2013). In Study 1, participants were randomly assigned
to receive a negative, positive, or neutral mood induction prior
to completion of the IGT. It was hypothesized that, when mood
is manipulated and measured temporally close to the decision
making task, individuals in a negative mood would exhibit more
advantageous decision making on the IGT. In Study 2, partici-
pants completed the delay discounting task (Kirby et al., 1999)
and two back-to-back administration of the IGT (200 trials total).
We hypothesized that performance on the IGT would become
more advantageous with additional trials, and that performance
on the delay discounting task would be correlated with perfor-
mance on the IGT (i.e., individuals would focus on short-term or
long-term goals on both tasks).
STUDY 1
METHODS
Participants
Participants were 194 undergraduate students (74 male; Mage =
19.44, SDage = 3.69; 72.5% Caucasian) enrolled in psychology
courses at The Ohio State University Newark and who received
course credit for their participation.
Measures
Measure of mood state. The 20-item Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS) was used to assess self-reported negative (10
items) and positive (10 items) mood state (Watson et al., 1988).
Participants were asked to respond to each item as to how they
felt in the present moment. For each subscale, responses to the 10
items were averaged, with higher scores indicating greater levels of
positive or negative mood. Internal consistency was moderately
high for both subscales (α = 0.78–0.87). The PANAS has been
used in several previous studies that manipulated mood (e.g.,
Heilman et al., 2010; Wendrich et al., 2010).
Decision making measure. The standard computerized IGT was
used to assess decision making (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara,
2008). The percent of selections from each deck were calcu-
lated for the decision making under ambiguity (Trials 1–40)
and decision making under risk trials separately (Trials 41–100;
Brand et al., 2007). Previous research has shown the importance
of assessing selections from each individual deck due to differ-
ences in the frequency and magnitude of immediate losses (see
Steingroever et al., 2013, for a review).
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Procedure
The study procedure was approved by the Institutional Review
Board at The Ohio State University, and all participants provided
written informed consent. Participants first completed an assess-
ment of their current mood state with the PANAS, and then com-
pleted a randomly assigned mood manipulation: positive (n =
63), neutral (n = 63), or negative (n = 68). Participants viewed
a series of pictures in their assigned mood condition that were
taken from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang
et al., 2008)1 . Average valence for each set, on a scale from 1 (nega-
tive) to 9 (positive), was as follows: negative 2.67, neutral 5.28, and
positive 7.13.
Each picture was presented on a computer screen for 6 s, with
a blank screen appearing for 3 s between each picture. To encour-
age participants to pay careful attention to each picture, they
were told their memory for the pictures would be tested at the
end of the stimulus presentation. After administration of the 20
“learning” trials, participants viewed a set of 35 pictures (consis-
tent with the assigned mood condition) and indicated whether
or not the picture was in the learning trial. Twenty of the 35
pictures were the same pictures seen during the learning trials,
and the remaining 15 pictures were comprised of additional pos-
itive, negative, or neutral stimuli from the IAPS2 . After the mood
induction, participants completed a second rating of their cur-
rent mood with the PANAS immediately followed by the standard
computerized IGT.
Data analysis
In order to determine changes in mood, One-Way ANOVAs were
conducted on the positive and negative PANAS scores at Time
1 and Time 2. To determine whether the mood manipulation
affected preferences for individual decks during decision making
under risk, MANOVAs were conducted with mood group as the
between-subjects variable and percent selections from the indi-
vidual decks on Trials 1–40 or Trials 41–100 as the within group
variables.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Manipulation check
No differences were found between groups in positive, F(2, 187) =
0.609, p = 0.545; or negative, F(2, 187) = 1.260, p = 0.286; mood
prior to the mood induction (see Table 1 for all means and stan-
dard deviations). The Positive mood group reported a significant
increase in positive mood from Time 1 to Time 2, F(2, 189) =
4.269, p = 0.015, η2p = 0.043, and the Negative mood group
experienced a significant increase in negative mood from Time 1
1Item numbers from the IAPS for the learning trials: negative (1202, 1300,
2141, 2703, 2981, 3005.1, 3103, 3185, 3230, 6312, 6520, 6838, 7380, 9050,
9075, 9320, 9432, 9470, 9904, 9940), neutral (2036, 2107, 2191, 2359, 2374,
5390, 5410, 5731, 7019, 7021, 7026, 7033, 7041, 7052, 7057, 7061, 7081, 7175,
7500, 8312), and positive (1340, 1659, 1710, 1920, 2040, 2070, 2091, 2209,
2224, 2311, 2550, 4250, 4612, 5210, 5480, 7405, 7502, 8163, 8208, 8420).
2Additional IAPS pictures used during memory trials: negative (1019, 1230,
1275, 1280, 1302, 1321, 2095, 2220, 2980, 3022, 6230, 6570, 9163, 9630, 9911),
neutral (1675, 2005, 2026, 2190, 2594, 5764, 5811, 7000, 7001, 7009, 7012,
7018, 7025, 7211, 7950), and positive (1500, 1540, 1595, 1604, 1660, 2035,
2151, 2540, 4574, 4575, 4597, 5202, 5814, 7325).
Table 1 | Study 1 variables presented as mean (standard deviation).
Variable Neutral Negative Positive
PANAS-P T1 2.79 (0.79) 2.90 (0.78) 2.94 (0.82)
PANAS-N T1 1.50 (0.50) 1.50 (0.50) 1.38 (0.40)
PANAS-P T2 2.74 (0.82) 2.66 (0.81) 3.06 (0.82)a
PANAS-N T2 1.40 (0.53) 1.71 (0.82)b 1.21 (0.31)
PANAS-P T2-T1 −0.07 (0.58) −0.21 (0.54) 0.13 (0.67)c
PANAS-N T2-T1 −0.11 (0.31) 0.17 (0.75)b −0.17 (0.32)
IGT PERCENT DECK SELECTION
Trials 1–40
A 22.17 (8.21) 20.87 (7.44) 21.83 (5.87)
B 32.58 (11.45) 32.23 (12.52) 31.79 (9.92)
C 21.08 (6.30) 22.84 (9.63) 22.04 (6.13)
D 24.13 (9.20) 24.05 (15.29) 24.33 (9.96)
Trials 41–100
A 16.92 (7.79) 15.86 (7.61) 16.97 (10.99)
B 30.22 (16.19) 30.23 (15.12) 27.36 (13.99)
C 18.86 (9.42) 23.84 (12.59)b 19.53 (8.08)
D 34.00 (17.45) 30.05 (16.46) 36.08 (20.45)
aPositive > Neutral, Negative.
bNegative > Neutral, Positive.
cPositive > Negative.
PANAS, Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; Positive (P) or Negative (N) sub-
scale, pre-mood induction (T1) or post-mood induction (T2); IGT, Iowa Gambling
Task; average percentage selections by deck for Trials 41–100.
to Time 2, F(2, 189) = 11.670, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.110. The neutral
group remained unchanged.
Decision making performance
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted, independent of
group status, to determine deck preferences on each set of tri-
als. During Trials 1–40, participants showed a preference for Deck
B over the remaining decks, F(3, 555) = 35.846, p < 0.001, η2p =
0.162. On Trials 41–100, participants selected more from Decks
B and D than Decks A and C, F(3, 555) = 43.583, p < 0.001, η2p =
0.191. A MANOVA on the decision making under ambiguity tri-
als (Trials 1–40) indicated no significant differences in deck selec-
tions between mood groups, Wilks’  = 0.979, F(8, 360) = 0.477,
p = 0.872, η2p = 0.010. Results of the MANOVA on the decision
making under risk trials (Trials 41–100) indicated a significant
difference between mood groups, Wilks’  = 0.916, F(8, 360) =
2.010, p = 0.044, η2p = 0.043. Individuals in the Negative mood
group selected significantly more from Deck C during the later
trials than individuals in the Neutral (p = 0.007) and Positive
(p = 0.020) mood groups. No differences were found for Decks
A, B, or D (ps > 0.223).
The results of Study 1 indicated that inducing a negative
mood immediately prior to a decision making task can alter
decision making. Independent of mood group, participants pre-
ferred Decks B and D—two decks with different long-term
outcomes but the same low frequency of immediate losses.
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However, a preference for Deck C during the final trials was
seen among individuals in the Negative mood condition com-
pared to those in the Neutral or Positive mood conditions.
Deck C is considered an advantageous deck, in that it results
in long-term gains, but is associated with immediate losses on
50% of trials. The present findings suggest that individuals in
a negative induced mood began to select more from Deck C
during the decision making under risk trials. However, the real-
world applicability of this strategy is uncertain, as the finding
would suggest that individuals should deliberately put them-
selves in a bad mood prior to making important decisions. That
said, negative moods naturally occur in the real world and can
aid in decision making based on shifting focus to long-term
outcomes. For example, frequent negative interactions with a
romantic partner should direct focus toward long-term out-
comes and motivate further thinking on one’s situation, leading
to a different decision than the experience of frequent positive
interactions.
The specific mechanism by which participants began to
change their decision making strategy is unclear. Per the somatic
marker hypothesis, the experience of emotions helps guide deci-
sion making on this task (Bechara, 2004; Dunn et al., 2006;
Werner et al., 2009). It is possible a negative mood made par-
ticipants more attuned to long-term outcomes. However, we
should have also seen greater Deck C selections during the deci-
sion making under ambiguity trials (when somatic markers are
most influential; Bechara et al., 2005). Instead, this preference
occurred only on Trials 41–100, when increased cognitive pro-
cessing occurs (i.e., not just emotions guide decision making
on these trials; Maia and McClelland, 2004; Brand et al., 2007;
Guillaume et al., 2009).
It may then be possible that mood state affected cognitive pro-
cessing on this task. Individuals in a negative mood may have
engaged in increased conscious, deliberative thought before mak-
ing selections from each deck. Other research (not utilizing the
IGT) indicates that when individuals are allowed to think freely
(i.e., not constrained by time or other factors), positive mood
may decrease information processing compared to neutral or neg-
ative moods (Mackie and Worth, 1989, 1991; Schwarz, 1990).
In addition, individuals in a negative mood focus more on spe-
cific details (Bless et al., 1996; Gasper, 2003), which could help
them understand the nuances of a particular situation or deci-
sion better (Gasper, 2003). In addition, those in a negative mood
state are more sensitive to signals of punishment (Fredrickson,
1998), which could allow for a change in decision making strategy
to avoid punishments (Fredrickson, 1998; Grawitch and Munz,
2005).
While the somatic marker hypothesis may explain early deci-
sions on the IGT, cognitive processes likely influence later
decisions. It may be that inducing a negative mood mod-
erates the relationship between deliberative thought processes
and decision making on the IGT; however, in the present
study deliberative thought was not directly assessed. Future
research investigating the influence of mood state, deliberative
thought processes, and the relationship between these two fac-
tors on decision making on the IGT should directly assess these
constructs.
STUDY 2
METHODS
Participants
Participants were 276 undergraduate students (111males,Mage =
19.18, SDage = 2.58; 75.7% Caucasian) enrolled in psychology
courses at The Ohio State University Newark and who received
course credit for their participation.
Measures
Iowa gambling task. The standard computerized IGTwas utilized
(Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, 2008); however, an additional 100
trials were administered. Performance was broken down by the
percentage of selections from each individual deck on Trials 1–40
(Block 1), Trials 41–100 (Block 2), Trials 101–140 (Block 3), and
Trials 141–200 (Block 4).
Delay discounting task. The 27-item Kirby et al. (1999) delay dis-
counting task was utilized. Participants chose between a series of
small, immediate rewards and delayed rewards of increased size.
For example, participants chose between receiving “$55 today or
$75 in 61 days” (Kirby et al., 1999). Previous research using this
task has shown individuals who prefer immediate rewards are
more impulsive and engage in higher levels of drug-using behav-
iors (Madden et al., 1997; Kirby et al., 1999). In the present study,
k-values indicating the extent of the delay discount were calcu-
lated, with higher values indicating a preference for immediate
gain over larger but distant rewards.
Procedure
The study procedure was approved by the Institutional Review
Board at The Ohio State University, and all participants provided
written informed consent. Participants completed the delay dis-
counting task and the standard computerized IGT (100 trials),
and then the IGT was immediately restarted for an additional 100
trials. All card decks refilled prior to the start of the second 100
trials.
Data analysis
Repeated-measures ANOVAs were used to assess preferences for
decks on each of the four blocks of trials. Thus, four repeated-
measures ANOVAs were conducted with deck (A, B, C, D) serving
as the sole within-subjects factor. Only significant post-hoc results
are reported below. Of note, participants were forced to choose
from one of the four decks on each trial. A selection from Deck B,
for example, indicated that the individual could not have selected
from the other decks (i.e., selections are linked on each trial).
Correlations were also calculated between k-values on the delay
discounting task and IGT Block 2 and Block 4 performance for
Decks A, B, C, and D separately. Due to study time constraints,
valid data on the delay discounting task was available for only
180/276 participants.
Additional analyses were conducted to further examine the
preference for short- vs. long-term rewards and the relation-
ship between delay discounting and IGT performance. Previous
research has compared the preference for Deck B over Deck D
(Buelow and Suhr, in press), as these decks have the same fre-
quency of losses (10% of trials) but different long-term outcomes
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(deficit with B and gain with D). Ratios of selections from Deck
B divided by selections from Deck D (B/D) were calculated for
Block 2 and Block 4. Larger B/D ratios indicate a relative prefer-
ence for Deck B over Deck D, and smaller B/D ratios indicate a
relative preference for Deck D over Deck B.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
IGT analyses
Results of the ANOVA on Block 1 indicated a significant
effect, F(3, 822) = 59.680, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.179 (see Figure 2).
Participants showed a preference for Deck B over the remain-
ing decks (ps < 0.001). Significant differences in deck selections
were also seen during Block 2, F(3, 822) = 54.856, p < 0.001, η2p =
0.167. Participants favored Decks B, C, and D over Deck A (ps <
0.001), the deck associated with “pathological decision making”
(Bechara, 2008).
Next, the additional 100 trials were examined. A significant
effect was found for Block 3, F(3, 822) = 33.478, p < 0.001, η2p =
0.109. Participants again selected more from Decks B (ps <
0.001) and D (ps < 0.001). Deck C was also selected more
than Deck A (p < 0.001). Finally, a significant effect was found
for Block 4 (when the relative risks and benefits of decisions
should be very clear), F(3, 822) = 55.694, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.168.
Participants selected more fromDeck D than the remaining decks
(ps < 0.009). Participants also selected more from Decks B and
C than from Deck A (ps < 0.001). Thus, participants learned to
decide more advantageously with additional trials by increasing
the number of selections from a deck that maximized long-term
rewards over a deck that provided more frequent immediate
rewards (see Figure 2).
Delay discounting analyses
At the conclusion of the standard IGT (Block 2), no significant
correlations were found between individual deck selections and
delay discounting (ps > 0.086). A tendency to prefer more imme-
diate (but smaller) rewards over larger (but more distant) rewards
on the delay discounting task was associated with greater Deck
B (r = 0.177, p = 0.017) but fewer Deck D (r = −0.189, p =
0.011) selections on Block 4. Thus, a preference for immediate
gains on the IGT was also seen on a second decision making task.
FIGURE 2 | Depiction of IGT Performance in Study 2. x-axis, IGT Block;
y -axis, Percent selections from each deck. Error bars reflect standard errors.
Additional analyses
Additional analyses were conducted comparing the ratio of selec-
tions from Decks B and D for Blocks 2 and 4. For Block 2,
the B/D ratio was 2.26 (SD = 4.54). For Block 4, the B/D ratio
was 1.39 (SD = 1.83). A paired-samples t-test indicated that the
preference for Deck B was greater for Block 2 than Block 4,
t(272) = 3.058, p = 0.002, providing further evidence of this shift
toward consideration of long-term outcomes in deck decisions
with additional learning trials.
We further analyzed whether the extent of delay discount-
ing (k) could predict the B/D ratio for Block 2 and Block 4.
For Block 2, the result was not significant, F(1, 176) = 0.508, p =
0.477. However, for Block 4, performance on the delay discount-
ing task was a significant predictor, F(1, 176) = 4.289, p = 0.040,
R2 = 0.024, B = 6.301. A preference for smaller, more immediate
rewards on the delay discounting task predicted greater selections
from Deck B than Deck D during Block 4.
Non-learners
Individual patterns of performance were also examined to deter-
mine what percentage of participants “failed to learn” on the first
100 trials (i.e., did not exhibit a preference for a deck). Seventy-
three participants (26.5%) failed to develop a preference for a
specific deck (or decks) on Trials 41–100, instead continuing to
choose from each deck equally. Of those 73, 53 (75.7%) went
on to develop a preference for a specific deck during the second
100 trials. Repeated measures ANOVAs indicated that this was
due to increased Deck D selections, F(1, 52) = 3.990, p = 0.051,
η2p = 0.071, and decreased Deck A selections, F(1, 52) = 6.932,
p = 0.011, η2p = 0.118, from Block 2 to Block 4. Thus, with addi-
tional trials to learn from the feedback received, individuals who
were classified as “non-learners” on the standard IGT eventually
learned to choose advantageously on the task, and also showed a
preference for a deck with positive long-term outcomes.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Individuals make numerous decisions on a daily basis that can
have a tremendous impact on both current and future func-
tioning. These decisions could include whether or not to keep
smoking cigarettes, what car to buy or lease, whether to start a
new relationship, or choosing between colleges that provide dif-
fering levels of monetary support. Many decisions are comprised
of both short- and long-term gains and losses, and which of these
components individuals choose to focus on will likely lead to dif-
ferent outcomes. Moreover, a myopic focus on the frequency of
immediate rewards might result in the fallacious feeling that one
has made a good decision, when in fact a focus on long-term
consequences may have led to a better decision (Bechara et al.,
1994).
In Study 1, deliberately inducing a negative mood altered deci-
sion making. Specifically, individuals in a negative mood began to
choose more from Deck C, a deck associated with more frequent
immediate losses but long-term positive outcomes, as the task
progressed. This finding is in contrast to previous research that
has shown a Deck B preference (e.g., Toplak et al., 2005; Caroselli
et al., 2006; Fernie and Tunney, 2006). Past research has exam-
ined the relationship between decision making and self-reported
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(e.g., Kaplan et al., 2006; Suhr and Tsanadis, 2007; Smoski et al.,
2008; Roiser et al., 2009a,b; Heilman et al., 2010) and manip-
ulated (Harlé and Sanfey, 2007; de Vries et al., 2008) mood to
determine the causal nature of mood’s effects on decision mak-
ing on the IGT, with mixed results. Moreover, extant research has
examined the IGT by comparing preferences for Decks A and
B (the disadvantageous decks based on long-term outcomes) to
Decks C and D (the advantageous decks based on long-term out-
comes), leading to an inability to examine discrepancies between
the decks in terms of frequency of immediate rewards/losses
and long-term outcomes. The present results indicate the impor-
tance of examining individual deck preferences on the IGT
(e.g., Caroselli et al., 2006; Bechara, 2008; Buelow and Suhr,
2013; Buelow et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2013), as this process can
shed light on these different components in the decision-making
process.
The results of Study 2 indicated that decision making on the
IGT can be improved with the administration of additional learn-
ing trials. Although at the start of the tasks participants selected
significantly more from Decks B and D (i.e., the decks with losses
on only 10% of trials), with additional trials in which to learn
from feedback, they began to select fromDeck D instead (the deck
with a beneficial long-term outcome). This finding is consistent
with the patterns of performance in several previous studies of
decision making on the IGT, in which the pattern of selections
showed an apparent “slowed learning curve” (e.g., Perretta et al.,
2005; Delazer et al., 2009; Oyama et al., 2011). Although in many
situations individuals may not be able to make repeated decisions,
they can rehearse before making the decision, and increasing this
practice may improve subsequent decisions. We also found that
76% of participants who failed to develop a deck preference on
the standard IGT did so during the additional trials, and tended
to be in favor of selecting more from Deck D and less from Deck
A. Thus, providing additional learning trials to a large sample of
control participants reversed a decision making impairment (if
the standard 100-trial IGT was used to determine decision mak-
ing deficits) as has been shown in clinical (Buelow et al., 2013)
and smaller control samples (Lin et al., 2013). Future research
should continue to investigate this tendency to develop a deck
preference later in the task, as it is possible that personality char-
acteristics and other factors can help predict who would benefit
from additional learning trials on decision making tasks.
Additionally, the present results indicated that individuals
who preferred more immediate rewards on the IGT also pre-
ferred more immediate rewards on a second decision making
task. Specifically, participants who discounted future rewards
on the delay discounting task made more selections from Deck
B and fewer selections from Deck D. A participant who was
better able to delay receipt of a reward in order to receive
a larger reward showed advantageous decision making on the
IGT, indicating that the participant was likely able to antici-
pate future outcomes (i.e., long-term gains) on both tasks (Petry
et al., 1998). Our finding is consistent with other research show-
ing individuals often make bad decisions due to discounting
their future affective state (Kassam et al., 2008), or make more
impatient decisions due to failure to anticipate future affect
(Mitchell et al., 2011).
IMPLICATIONS
The present studies are among the first to show that exter-
nal manipulations can change decision making, and in some
cases (Study 2), shift focus from the frequency of immediate
gains/losses to long-term outcomes on the IGT. Previous research
that manipulated long-term outcomes on the IGT to be even
more positive has shown participants continue to focus on the
frequency of gains/losses (Lin et al., 2007, 2009; Chiu et al., 2008),
resulting in continued non-optimal decisions. In the present stud-
ies, we have shown that temporal focus can be shifted on this task,
and that this shift is associated with performance on a second task.
This shifting of focus has implications for the way in which the
decision making process is conceptualized, as it could further dif-
ferentiate types of decision making impairments. Administering
a 200-trial version of the IGT, for example, could allow clini-
cians and researchers to determine if impairments seen on the
task reflect difficulties learning from feedback or frank decision
making impairment. This differentiation could lead to different
personality and mood predictors, as well as potentially different
outcomes on subsequent tasks.
In addition, the present study represents an advance from pre-
vious studies that focused on the original IGT scoring system (i.e.,
advantageous minus disadvantageous selections) that can mask
deck-level preferences. The present results suggest that utilizing
an individual deck-level approach can illuminate differences in
focus on short- vs. long-term outcomes, or in the individual’s
weighting of the importance of these differing outcomes, and are
in keeping with recent deck-level analysis trends (e.g., Buelow
and Suhr, 2013; Steingroever et al., 2013). Administering a sec-
ond measure of decision making that is sensitive to a focus on
short- vs. long-term outcomes can also aid in the determination
of whether disadvantageous decision making on the IGT is due
to a myopic focus on immediate reward at the expense of positive
long-term outcomes.
In addition, it may be worthwhile to investigate whether addi-
tional manipulations can be used to shift focus from immediate
rewards to consideration of long-term outcomes. Finally, it would
be important for future research to investigate whether the pres-
ence/absence of somatic markers during both early and later trials
can predict who is more likely to decide advantageously after
additional learning trials, as this may help to shed light on who
learns and who does not learn with these additional practice trials.
Individuals who—in a standard single administration of the
IGT—would have been classified as non-learners (either due to a
lack of effort on the task or due to a failure to pick an advanta-
geous strategy on the task)—were able to improve their decision
making with additional trials. These data indicate that not all
decision making deficits are equal, and that some individuals may
simply need additional trials to learn from feedback during the
decision making process. This difference is important for clini-
cians and researchers who utilize the IGT, as individuals who need
more trials in which to learn to decide advantageously may reflect
a different type of decision making impairment (i.e., less severe)
than those who never learn to stay away from the bad decks. Thus,
our data suggest that examining decision making using a binary
outcome (i.e., bad/disadvantageous or good/advantageous) may
not be sufficient on its own to detect more fine-grained decision
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making impairments. It is also important to understand what fac-
tors may be keeping a subgroup of participants from learning to
decide advantageously, even after additional learning trials.
Finally, the present results suggest that both induced negative
mood and additional learning trials can alter decision making on
the IGT; however, it is unclear if these two factors may inter-
act with one another to improve or impair decision making.
For example, do individuals in a negative mood begin to select
from Deck D even quicker during additional learning trials than
someone in a positive mood? Or, does negative mood increase
deliberative thinking and elaboration on decisions made during
additional learning trials? Future research should investigate how
these factors collectively affect decision making on the IGT and
other tasks.
CONCLUSIONS
The present studies sought to investigate two novel methods of
improving decision making: inducing negative mood and provid-
ing additional learning trials. Inducing a negative mood altered
decisionmaking during the later trials, while providing additional
learning trials improved decision making even among individuals
who would have been classified as “non-learners” on the task.
The current results also suggest the existence of subtle differ-
ences in temporal focus during the decision making process that
should be an avenue for future exploration. Specifically, future
research should investigate the implications of the present studies
for decision making utilizing other behavioral and ecologically
valid measures. Future research should also investigate the extent
to which a focus on long-term outcomes vs. frequency of immedi-
ate rewards affects future attitude formation toward novel objects
(e.g., Fazio et al., 2004), and how evaluation of affective valence
alters decision making and risk-taking (e.g., Pietri et al., 2013).
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